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BUDGETARY DILEMMAS IN PAKISTAN 
Costs and Benefits of Sustained 
Defense Expenditures 
Robert E. Looney 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the major macro-
economic impacts of defense expenditures on the Pakistani economy. This 
approach involves three interrelated steps. 
The first identifies the economy's main macroeconomic patterns and trends 
with emphasis placed on the major problems currently facing policy makers. 
In particular, what structural problems currently constrain the economy's 
growth? What policy options are available to moderate these difficulties? 
Which budgetary patterns are sustainable? 
The second step examines the manner in which defense expenditures have 
interacted with the economy. What are the interdependencies between de-
fense and overall growth. Have defense expenditures contributed to the cur-
rent structural imbalances? If so in what manner? Have defense expendi-
tures initiated macroeconomic change or simply reflected movements in the 
major aggregates? 
The third step, through use of a macroeconomic model, assesses the main 
factors identified in steps one and two. Here our main interest is to assess the 
manner in which the Pakistani economy might have evolved if the govern-
ment had adopted alternative budgetary programs. Did defense and 
nondefense expenditures affect the economy in a similar manner? If so, in 
what way? Based on the findings from these historical simulations, a series 
of forecasts are made to the year 2000. Here we are interested in examining 
alternative defense/nondefense expenditure patterns. Which types of expend-
itures would be most productive in alleviating the country's structural imbal-
ances? Which budgetary strategies are sustainable? What major impacts 
would result from a redirection of expenditures from defense to nondefense? 
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The philosophy underlying this approach stresses the importance of examin-
ing defense expenditures in the context of the government's overall develop-
ment and budgetary strategies. 
Although Pakistan's growth performance during the 1980s was healthy 
(averaging more than 6% per annum) and inflation, while fluctuating consid-
erably, was generally moderate (averaging 7% per annum), the increasing 
macroeconomic imbalances, growth in public sector deficits and indebted-
ness, and underlying structural weaknesses convinced the government that 
without corrective action the economy's growth could not be sustained. Ac-
cordingly, in early FY 1989 the government embarked on a macroeconomic 
structural adjustment program that has since been implemented more or less 
continuously. The government realized that the economy's main weaknesses 
were low savings/investment rates, particularly in the public sectori" structural 
rigidities and distortions in the incentive system, which reduced efficiency 
and depressed economic activity; and weak social indicators, in particular, 
low literacy and poor health conditions. 
Faced with the need to address these challenges, the government's adjust-
ment program sought to improve financial balances, increase average savings 
rates (especially public), and promote private sector investment and activity. 
In particular, the objective was to achieve an overall GDP growth rate of 
about 5.5%-6% per annum. In terms of microeconomic measures, reforms 
were to be introduced to deregulate economic activity and investment, liber-
alize the trade and exchange systems, rationalize the tariff system, adjust reg-
ulated prices (especially in the energy and agricultural sectors), reform the 
financial system, and promote foreign direct and portfolio investments. 
These reforms were to be complemented by improvements in the structure 
of public finance to reduce the distortionary impact of taxes, increase the 
buoyancy of the tax system, and redirect resources to key projects and pro-
grams in the social sectors and infrastructure. In addition, these policies were 
to be supported by a reduction in the overall fiscal deficit to 4.8% of GDP in 
order to reduce excessive aggregate demand pressures and improve financial 
stability. 
There is considerable consensus on the desirability of these policy reforms 
and also on the fiscal parameters needed to achieve macroeconomic balance. 1 
For the purposes of the simulations below, the key policy targets are the 
5%-6% real GDP growth within the context of a fiscal deficit in the 5% of 
GDP range. Secondary targets involve an increase in savings and in the share 
of resources invested by the private sector. 
l. The stabilization program is supported by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, the Japanese government, and a number of international agencies. 
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Previous Studies on the Macroeconomy 
While a number of studies have examined Pakistan's macroeconomy, none 
has explicitly introduced military expenditures into a formal simulation 
model.2 Still, these studies provide a number of useful insights into the basic 
workings of the economy, and many of them focus on the potential problems 
associated with increased budget deficits. Here it is important to note that 
budgetary deficits in themselves do not automatically imply macroeconomic 
problems. If the use of public resources is sufficiently productive, further 
income can be generated to cover the servicing costs of any debt incurred. 
Deficits can be more easily absorbed by countries with high rates of domestic 
savings and well developed capital markets. Thus, a relatively high deficit 
need not cause problems in an efficient, high-saving economy, whereas in a 
low-saving economy like Pakistan's (6% of GDP) with inefficient and less 
developed financial markets, even a small deficit might be stabilizing. 
Crowding out. Starting from this position, Khan and lqbal3 examined the 
whole issue of crowding out, that is, whether the ever-rising government ex-
penditures displace equal amounts of spending from the private sector. Their 
main findings suggest that increases in the fiscal deficit have reduced private 
savings and, hence, investment and growth in Pakistan. Besides the existence 
of financial repression (low or negative real interest rates) and lack of finan-
cial development (few financial institutions and the availability of few finan-
cial instruments), the fiscal deficit appears to be an important factor in 
accounting for such low savings. In short, their findings suggest that govern-
ment savings are a substitute for private savings. In a related paper on factors 
affecting private investment,4 Khan concluded: 
l. On the one hand, changes in output appear to have minor impact on 
private investment, while on the other hand, the general market condition 
appears to have a strong influence on private capital formation. 
2. See, for example, Salim U. Chishti, M. Aynul Hasan, and Syed F. Mahmud, "Macro-
economic Modelling and Pakistan's Economy: A Vector Autoregression Approach," Journal of 
Development Economics, vol. 38 (1992), pp. 353-70. The methods used in this study are some-
what controversial and have often been characterized as "largely atheoretical and mechanistic." 
The authors conclude that "the impact of fiscal (via increase in government expenditure) in 
Pakistan is weak because about 75 percent of the total current expenditures of the federal govern-
ment is in general accounted for by defense and debt servicing which have no significant impact 
on GDP" (p. 369). It should be noted, however, that the authors never introduce defense expend-
itures into their model. 
3. A. H. Khan and Z. Iqbal, "Fiscal Deficit and Private Sector Activities in Pakistan," 
Economia lntemazionale, XLIV, 2-3 (May-Augbst 1991), pp. 182-90. 
4. Ashfaque H. Khan, "Macroeconomic Policy and Private Investment in Pakistan," Pakistan 
Development Review, 27:3 (Autumn 1988), pp. 277-91. 
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2. Private investment in Pakistan is constrained by the availability of 
funds. Thus, the monetary authority can influence private investment behav-
ior by changing the system of bank credit to this sector. Fiscal policy appears 
to have a relatively stronger effect on private investment. 
3. Public sector investment in infrastructure clearly augments private capi-
tal formation in Pakistan, thereby confirming its complementary role. 
In contrast to Khan and Iqbal, Burney and Yasmeen focused on the budget-
ary effects on interest rates.5 Their findings suggest that in general the over-
all government budget deficit in Pakistan does not have a significant impact 
on the nominal interest rate. However, when it is assumed that people can 
predict the future rate of inflation accurately, the overall deficit is found to 
have a significant impact on the nominal interest rate. Although they do not 
directly examine the impact on private investment, it is noted that there may 
be an inverse relationship between investment and nominal interest rates.6 If 
this is in fact the case, their results suggest that an increase in the overall 
deficit is likely to crowd out private investment expenditure in Pakistan. 
In short, the studies noted here suggest that defense and other public ex-
penditures, through their retarding effect on private investment, may not have 
provided much of a stimulus to longer-run economic growth. 
Causation. Another area of relevance is the linkages between defense ex-
penditure and GDP. Have defense expenditures had an impact on GDP, or 
have they been largely facilitated instead by the overall expansion in re-
sources over time? In terms of direct links between defense and economic 
growth, a recent study7 examining the period 1958-88 concluded: 
1. The economic impact of defense expenditures has shifted over time. In 
an earlier period (1958-73), defense expenditures had a negative impact on 
economic growth. 
2. The negative impact appears to have been associated largely with the 
speed of increase in defense expenditures (see Figure 1) and the inability of 
the country to expand defense expenditures in line with the country's eco-
nomic resources. Specifically, causation analysis indicates that during much 
of the 1958-73 period, Indian defense spending initiated a subsequent expan-
sion in Pakistan's allocations to the military. 
3. This relationship changed in the period after 1973 to one characterized 
by feedback effects-increased growth provided additional resources for de-
5. Nadeem A. Burney and Attiya Yasmeen, "Government Budget Deficits and Interest Rates: 
An Empirical Analysis for Pakistan," Pakistan Development Review, vol. 28:4, Part II (Winter 
1989), pp. 971-80. 
6. From an unpublished study by Bumey cited in ibid., p. 976. 
7. Robert E. Looney, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Performance in South Asia: 
Tests of Causality and Interdependence," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 11 :2 (Spring 
1991), pp. 37-68. 
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fense and defense expenditures in tum stimulated further growth. This period 
also coincided with a shift in the arms race to a pattern whereby India in-
creased defense expenditures in response to expanded Pakistani allocations to 
the military.8 
4. In contrast there were no strong linkages from nondefense expenditures 
to economic growth. If anything, the post-1973 period has been character-
ized by a situation in which increases in growth have actually led to reduc-
tions in resources allocated to nondefense activities. 
To sum up, the series of expenditure/revenue patterns noted here are sug-
gestive of the general budgetary process in Pakistan. Specifically, the gov-
ernment is forced to allocate a large share of its expanded revenues to the 
military during periods when it feels it must increase military allocations to 
counter increased Indian militarization. In contrast, during periods when de-
fense expenditures are undertaken for reasons other than an increase in the 
perceived threat from India, the government apparently has the luxury of ex-
ploring alternative sources of financing. In the short run, it expands alloca-
8. In part, the shift in the pattern of Indian defense expenditures no doubt reflected an Indian 
strategy (starting in 1972) of maintaining a 3:1 l~ad over Pakistan. I am indebted to an anony-
mous referee for suggesting this phenomenon as a factor in the causal shift in the arms race of 
one from India to Pakistan pre-1973 to one from Pakistan to India, post-1973. 
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tions to the military largely from increased revenues. Passive adjustments are 
then made to the nonmilitary part of the budget. In this way, development 
expenditures have a difficult time playing a role in initiating economic 
growth, appearing to be an afterthought and expanded more to correct fund-
ing imbalances than to play an initiating role. 
Defense and Macroeconomic Policy 
Drawing on the general direction of causation together with the main impact 
patterns noted above, a 10 equation policy model was developed.9 Our chief 
concern was to capture the main potential areas that defense might conceiva-
bly affect-growth, private investment, savings, and the fiscal deficit. For 
some of these variables, such as growth, the links are direct. For others, such 
as private investment, the links are more indirect, working though the impact 
of defense on the deficit, the impact of the deficit on savings, and ultimately 
the impact of savings on private investment. With regard to the more impor-
tant individual equations: 
1. Growth is affected mainly by employment, lagged military expendi-
tures, and private investment. 10 It should be noted that the links between 
GDP and nondefense expenditures were not statistically significant. The 
same was true for government investment. 
2. Defense expenditures were found to be a function of lagged GDP. In 
addition, allocations to the military were reduced with increased funding of 
government investment and an expansion in the public deficit. 
3. Private investment follows a standard distributed lag pattern, 11 whereby 
it adjusts over time to bridge the differences between the actual capital stock 
and that desired by investors. It also exhibits a factor noted by Khan and 
Iqbal: reliance on savings. Finally, these expenditures are stimulated by 
nondefense expenditures. 
9. The full model, together with the underlying data base used in its construction, is available 
from the author upon request. 
IO. Ideally, one would have liked to use a neoclassical formulation of the type developed by 
Mintz and Huang and adapted successfully by Ward et al. to the Indian situation. Unfortunately, 
in the case of Pakistan several of the key variables (in particular nondefense expenditures and 
government investment) were not statistically significant. See Alex Mintz and C. Huang, "De-
fense Expenditures, Economic Growth, and the Peace Dividend," American Political Science 
Review, vol. 84 (1990), pp. 1283-93; and Michael Ward et al., "Economic Growth, Investment, 
and Military Spending in India, 1950--88," in Steve Chan and Alex Mintz, eds., Defense, Wel-
fare, and Growth: Perspectives and ~vidence (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. ll9-36. 
11. See Robert Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and Economic Fore-
casts (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), for a description of this model and its theoretical ration-
ale. 
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4. Gross national savings12 expand with the overall growth of the econ-
omy. However, these funds are preempted (or crowded out) by the fiscal 
deficit. 
To get a rough idea of the quantitative magnitudes of impact produced by 
changes in defense expenditures, the economy was simulated under the as-
sumption that allocations to the military had been 5% lower each year over 
the sample (1974-91) period. In general, this reduction in expenditures 
would have: 
1. Reduced GDP over most of the period under consideration. This effect 
is fairly strong. For example, in 1991 GDP was reduced by about 2.5% 
(650.7 versus 666.9) as a result of the hypothesized decline in allocations to 
defense. 
2. Reduced private investment. On a percentage basis these reductions 
were high at times-in 1991 amounting to a reduction in private investment 
of 4.5% (56.9 versus 59.6)-but fairly marginal for most years. One fact 
brought out by the simulations is that due to the complex links between de-
fense and the private sector, one cannot make an a priori judgment for any 
particular year as to the possible direction a change in the defense budget 
might have on the direction of change in investment. While the general rule 
is that investment should decrease, as indicated by the simulation results, it is 
possible for private investment to be stimulated by a contraction of the de-
fense budget (as in 1974, 1975, 1988, and 1989). 
3. Made the general direction of change stemming from a movement in 
defense harder to predict as the linkages between defense and a particular 
macro variable become more complex (multiple feedback effects, indirect 
linkages, and the like). For example, in the early 1970s, gross national sav-
ings generally increase with a decline in defense expenditures. However, 
throughout most of the 1980s, savings would have been depressed by the 
reduction in allocations to the military. In this sense, savings mirror the pat-
terns found in the fiscal deficit. 
4. Found the patterns of the fiscal deficit13 to be paradoxical. In some 
years, reducing defense expenditures actually causes the deficit to increase. 
However, on closer examination it is clear that this result is simply caused by 
the decline in defense becoming a drag on the expansion in GDP. Since 
revenues are a function of the change in GDP, modifications in the expansion 
12. It should be noted that gross national savings is used here. Due to the large component of 
worker remittances, gross domestic savings fluctuates erratically. These remittances are no 
doubt purely exogenous and as such tend to mask the relationship between government expendi-
tures, the deficit, and the change in savings. • 
13. For purposes of presentation, the deficit is defined as government revenues minus expend-
itures, i.e., higher values mean that the deficit is increasing. 
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of income quickly modify the path of revenue, hence, the increase in the size 
of the overall deficit. 
Reduced levels of nondefense expenditures also produce an interesting pat-
tern of macroeconomic change: 
1. Because nondefense expenditures do not affect GDP directly (and posi-
tively as in the case of defense), there is a general increase in income. In 
1991, for example, GDP would have been 2.4% higher if nonmilitary ex-
penditures had been 5% lower throughout the period under consideration. 
2. Again, as in the case of defense expenditures, the impact of changes in 
the nondefense component on private investment are difficult to predict. Be-
cause private investment is directly stimulated through nondefense expendi-
tures and because reductions in nondefense expenditures increase GDP, one 
would anticipate a general expansion in private sector capital formation. 
However, the simulation results suggest that in the 1970s and into the 1980s, 
private investment would have fallen. Again, it should be noted that the net 
impact of nondefense expenditures on private investment is rather marginal. 
3. One important contrast to the results obtained from the defense simula-
tions is the impact a corresponding decrease in the nondefense component of 
the budget would have on savings and the budget deficit. While the defense 
simulations often produced a mixed picture as to the general direction of 
change in these variables, reduced nondefense expenditures produce a sharp 
contraction in the deficit and ultimately a fairly dramatic increase in gross 
national savings. In 1991, for example, a contraction in nondefense expendi-
tures of this magnitude would have increased gross national savings by nearly 
13%. ' 
4. Again, the movements in the deficit are fairly easy to anticipate when 
nondefense expenditures are reduced. For each year over the period covered, 
there was a fairly significant reduction in the size of the overall fiscal deficit; 
in 1991 this would have amounted to about a 17% decline. 
The results obtained from other fiscal simulations are summarized in Table 1. 
As noted earlier, military expenditures have perhaps the most complex ef-
fects, followed by changes in revenues. The impact produced by nondefense 
expenditures is the easiest to predict. The results do point out the general 
policy dilemmas facing the Pakistani authorities. The standard measures for 
accelerating growth-curbing defense expenditures and expanding non-
defense-would, given the current macroeconomic environment, actually re-
sult in a fall in GDP. On the other hand, increases in defense expenditures, 
while generally expanding private investment, have often reduced gross na-
tional savings thus limiting s6mewhat the longer run effectiveness of this 






ROBERT E. LOONEY 425 
TABLE 1 General Patterns of Macroeconomic Change Associated with a 5 
Percent Variation in Public Expenditures and Revenues 
Private Gross 
Policy Change GDP Investment National Savings Fiscal Deficit 
Increase in Defense (+) (+) (+,-) (+,-) 
Expenditures in recent years in recent years 
(-) (+) 
Reduction in Defense (-) (-) (+,-) (+,-) 
Expenditures in recent years in recent years 
(-) (+) 
Increase in Non- (-) (-) (-) (++) 
Defense Expenditures 
Reduction in Non- (+) (+) (+) (-) 
Defense Expenditures 
Increase in (+) (+) (+) (+,-) 
Government in recent years 
Revenues (+) 
Decline in (-) (-) (+,-) (+,-) 
Government in recent years in recent years 
Revenues (+) (+) 
Future Macroeconomic Alternatives 
The same model used for the historical simulations can be adapted for fore-
casting purposes. In large part the model is a recursive one, with most vari-
ables determined largely by their values in previous years. The only 
exogenous variable is employment, which was set at its recent expansion of 
3 .11 % per annum. Using this value for employment and the lagged 1990 and 
1991 values for the endogenous variables, a base line forecast was made to 
the year 2000. As with the historical base simulation, the purpose of this 
forecast is to provide a benchmark for examining the impacts of alternative 
revenue and expenditure policy mixes. Several patterns are of note in the 
benchmark forecast: 
1. Given the recent trends in the economy and in the absence of any policy 
change, there would be a gradual slowing down of growth. This decline is 
gradual, with growth declining from around 6% in recent years to less than 
5% by 2000. 
2. There would be an expansion in military expenditures more or less in 
line with the overall economy. As a result, the defense burden (share of mili-
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tary expenditures in GDP) would stabilize at around 7.5% of GDP, more or 
less in line with the pattern found in recent years. 
3. Nondefense expenditures would expand faster than GDP, increasing 
their share from 16.6% of GDP in 1992 to 18.2% by 2000. 
4. Private investment would gradually increase its share of GDP, from 
8.7% in 1992 to 9.3% in 2000. At the same time there would be similar 
gradual increases in gross national savings, the fiscal deficit, government rev-
enues and total government expenditures. 
5. As noted earlier, an objective of the country's current stabilization pro-
gram is to reduce the size of the fiscal deficit to around 5% of GDP. The 
benchmark forecast is not consistent with this goal, the deficit increasing 
from 5.8% in 1992 to 6.3% in 2000. 
Except for the expansion of the fiscal deficit, these patterns of growth are 
acceptable by most Third World standards, but it may be possible to improve 
on them by varying the fiscal policy mix. In particular, lowering defense 
expenditures might enable the country to sustain more or less the same rate of 
growth while reducing the size of the fiscal deficit to within acceptable limits. 
As a first policy shift, therefore, defense expenditures were made exogenous 
and set at 5% in real terms. This is at a somewhat lower rate than the initial 
base-line simulation where defense expenditures reached Rs. 81.5 billion in 
the year 2000. As a result, defense expenditures stabilize at around 7% of 
GDP, rather than the 7.5% in the base forecast. The results of this simulation 
are consistent with the historical patterns noted above: 
1. In general, the overall expansion in the GDP would be lower (reaching 
Rs. 1039.2 billion in 2000 versus Rs. 1081.9 billion in the base forecast-a 
reduction of 3.8% in 2000). 
2. Nondefense expenditures would increase relative to allocations to the 
military. However, because of the slower rates of growth they would be 
slightly lower than the base forecast (Rs. 189 billion versus Rs. 197 .1 billion 
in 2000). 
3. Private investment would also be slightly lower as would gross national 
savings, the fiscal deficit, government revenues, and total government ex-
penditures. 
4. Most important, reducing defense expenditures by this magnitude would 
not necessarily lower the overall fiscal deficit to the target 5% range. In fact, 
throughout most of the 1990s it is in the high 5%, reaching 6.1 % by the year 
2000. 
Clearly reducing military expenditures without other structural changes, 
such as improving the productivity of government investments (infrastruc-
ture) and the like, cannot serve as a basis for increasing the long-run growth 
path of the economy and restore the 6% growth rates of the 1980s. Another 
alternative might be to increase nondefense expenditures somewhat in the 
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range of 10% per annum in real terms. Here, military expenditures would be 
determined by their historic patterns. The results of this simulation are even 
less encouraging: 
1. The overall rate of growth in GDP decelerates to 3.1 % by 2000. This 
occurs in the context of heavy reductions in military expenditures, with the 
defense burden declining to 6% in 2000. 
2. Nondefense expenditures are considerably above their benchmark, reach-
ing 26.4% of GDP in 2000. However, there is little to show for this expan-
sion. Private investment is only minimally above its benchmark while gross 
national savings fall from 11.9% of GDP in 1992 to 3.1 % in 2000. 
3. The deficit more than doubles to 13.l % of GDP by 2000. Clearly, this 
is not sustainable and would by itself invalidate the whole high nondefense 
growth strategy. 
Based on these two simulations, it is apparent that the key to higher growth 
in Pakistan will center around the government's ability to increase revenues. 
Since defense expenditures appear to stimulate growth, a policy of increasing 
allocations to the military as well as expanding the revenue base should pro-
vide a strong stimulus to the economy. The next simulation incorporated 
these policy changes, with defense expenditures expanding at 10% a year as 
are government revenues. The results of this policy shift are much more 
encouraging: 
1. The GDP growth rate gradually accelerates to over 8% by 2000, and in 
that year the GDP would be 21 % higher than in the simple base forecast. 
2. Of course military expenditure would expand in absolute terms, and its 
expanded share of GDP would rellch nearly 10% of GDP (compared to 7.5% 
in the base forecast). 
3. Even with defense accounting for the larger share of GDP, nondefense 
expenditures would increase from 16.3% of GDP to nearly 18% by 2000. 
4. Most important, the private sector would be stimulated, with capital for-
mation from this source reaching 9.5% of GDP. Private investment in the 
year 2000 would be around 24% higher than in the base forecast. Gross 
national savings would also expand to 19.3% of GDP (up from 15.9% in 
1992). 
5. Finally, the deficit would fall to an acceptable and sustainable level of 
3.3% of GDP. In fact, it would be below 5% for the entire forecast period. 
As a basis of comparison, the next forecast increased nondefense expendi-
tures and revenues by 10%. Several interesting patterns develop under this 
set of assumptions: 
1. While the overall rates of growth are not as satisfactory as those 
achieved with the high defense strategy,"they are still quite satisfactory. The 
rate of growth in GDP gradually accelerates to over 7% by 1998, reaching 
7.1% in 2000. 
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2. Military expenditures expand over their benchmark rate, reaching 7.8% 
in 2000, while nondefense expenditures expand to over 21 % of GDP. 
3. Private investment is actually slightly higher in this strategy, reaching 
Rs. 128.1 billion in 2000, versus Rs. 124.3 billion in the high defense/revenue 
strategy. 
4. On the other hand, gross national saving is lower and the fiscal deficit a 
bit higher-but still in an acceptable range of 4.4% of GDP-than that pro-
duced by the defense-led strategy. 
The final forecast combines a number of aspects of the ones previously 
described. This simulation asks whether it is possible to accelerate growth by 
holding defense expenditures at less than their historic rates of growth, that 
is, 5%. Again, we are assuming that the government has the will to increase 
revenues at a steady 10% per annum in real terms. Also _as part of this strat-
egy, there is a shift in resources to nondefense allocations so that they are 
also expanding at 10% per annum in real terms. The results are again encour-
aging: 
1. Under this set of assumptions, real growth accelerates to over 6%, 
reaching 6.3% per annum in 2000, by which time this amounts to an increase 
of nearly 6% over the base forecast. 
2. Military expenditures continue to expand in absolute terms although the 
defense burden falls to 6.4% of GDP in 2000. 
3. Under these conditions, nondefense expenditures would expand from 
17.3% of GDP in 1992 to 23% by 2000, a figure more or less in line with that 
of other comparable developing countries. 
4. Most important •. this strategy would be a real boon to the private sector. 
Private investors would expand investment to Rs. 130.6 billion (30% over the 
base forecast) under this set of assumptions. Gross national savings would 
also increase from 16% of GDP in 1992 to over 20% by 2000. 
5. Finally, this strategy would actually produce the lowest budgetary defi-
cits-only 2.7% of GDP by the year 2000. While the absolute size of the 
deficit is approximately the same as in the base scenario, the higher rates of 
GDP growth lower its percentage share dramatically. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to assess the options open to Pakistani 
policy makers facing the need to expand resources committed to development 
and social programs. After developing a small model of the economy, simu-
lations were performed to determine the rough magnitudes of the impact 
defense (and nondefense) expenditures would have on the major macro-
economic aggregates. While these simulations confirmed the positive link 
from defense to the economy, and the generally negative impact of 
nondefense expenditures on economic growth, a number of new insights were 
-------------iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii _________ _, 
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obtained. In particular, the model shows that the actual impacts of defense 
and nondefense expenditures can change fairly dramatically as the overall 
environment changes. The most important implication of this fact is that the 
government is not confined to its historical policy mix of using defense to 
offset economic fluctuations, while occasionally using defense expenditure to 
stimulate the economy. Instead, a selected policy of controlling defense ex-
penditures while expanding nondefense spending and revenues might, 
through stimulating domestic savings and private investment, provide the 
best basis for high sustained growth in the period up to the end of the century. 
